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* Banca d’Italia, Banking and Financial Supervision. 1.  Introduction
1 
In recent years, the increasing interest in financial stability as an autonomous policy 
target, along with monetary and microeconomic stability, has encouraged the analyses of the 
linkages between the macroeconomic environment and the soundness of the banking system.  
This stream of work is usually referred to as research on the “procyclicality” of banks’ 
operations. Most of these studies use the current status of macroeconomic conditions as the 
main exogenous cause for the state of health of banks. The goal is to assess to what extent 
macroeconomy affects banks’ performance (cyclicality) and whether, in turn, banks’ reaction 
to changing macroeconomic conditions further affects the macroeconomy, reinforcing 
cyclical fluctuations (procyclicality). These studies generally confirm that banks’ balance 
sheets are affected, simultaneously or with some delay, by the business cycle and claim that 
banks’ behaviour is procyclical. 
However, the change in banks’ behaviour through the business cycle is not explicitly 
modelled, but it is simply inferred looking at the reduced-form relationships between micro 
and macro-variables. Bank-specific indicators are frequently included as regressors, but they 
are only used as control variables, while the focus rests on the proxies for macroeconomic 
conditions. Furthermore, apart from some recent papers on North-American banks, no study 
assesses the role that macroeconomic uncertainty plays in determining banks’ behaviour: in 
other words, no attention is paid on the second moments of macroeconomic variables. 
Summing up, the current state of the art is unsatisfactory for two main reasons: i) no 
attempt is made in order to model how banks’ management varies in changing 
macroeconomic environments; ii) the effect of the uncertainty regarding future 
macroeconomic conditions is typically neglected.   
This paper tries to fill these gaps. In particular, it aims at disentangling which are the 
determinants of banks’ willingness to invest in risky loans as opposed to risk-free assets and 
                                                            
1  I am grateful to F. Cannata, J. Marcucci, A. Ozkan and P. N. Smith  for their comments and C. Medico 
for the final revision of the paper. Remaining errors are my own. The opinions expressed herein are those of the 
author and do not necessarily reflect those of Banca d’Italia. Email: mario.quagliariello@bancaditalia.it 
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understanding whether macroeconomic uncertainty plays a role in this choice. Following the 
portfolio model proposed by Baum et al. (2005), which provides an explicit link between the 
cross-bank dispersion of the share of loans held in portfolio and uncertainty, the paper 
discusses how Italian banks choose between loans and risk-free assets when the uncertainty 
of macroeconomic conditions increases. Given the substantial differences between North-
American and European banking sectors, this paper can provide useful insights on the 
reliability of the model when a different sample of intermediaries is used. 
An important innovation of this work is that, with respect to Baum et al., who neglect 
the role of idiosyncratic factors in the econometric specification, the impact of 
macroeconomic uncertainty is assessed after controlling for bank-specific sources of 
uncertainty. In particular, introducing an appropriate proxy, I explicitly consider the 
importance of idiosyncratic uncertainty in determining banks’ portfolio decisions. 
This paper also enriches the existing evidence employing different proxies for 
macroeconomic uncertainty; this also allows me to extensively assess the robustness of the 
results. Finally, the paper provides evidence on banks’ sub-samples, testing whether the 
theory is valid at different levels of aggregation.  
The econometric results confirm that macroeconomic uncertainty plays a significant 
role in Italian banks’ investment decisions. In periods of increasing turmoil, banks receive 
noisier signals on the expected returns of loans and, therefore, tend to behave more 
homogenously, as shown by the reduction of the loan-to-asset ratio cross-sectional 
dispersion. Idiosyncratic uncertainty is also relevant and its coefficient takes on a positive 
sign. When returns on specific investments are less easily predictable, better informed banks 
can exploit their competitive advantage and behave in a different way with respect to poorly-
informed intermediaries. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 provide a short 
survey of the literature and describe the portfolio model used in the analysis. Section 4  
reports the empirical results. Conclusions are provided in Section 5. 
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2.  Review of the literature 
There is a huge literature supporting the hypothesis that macroeconomic conditions 
affect the performance of the banking sector
2. Most of the work focuses on measures of 
central tendency rather than on those of uncertainty. 
Salas and Saurina (2002), for instance, observe that macroeconomic shocks are quickly 
transmitted to Spanish banks’ balance sheets. During economic booms, intermediaries tend 
to expand their lending activity, often relaxing their selection criteria; in the following 
downturns, bad loans remarkably increase, producing losses. Using a panel of Italian banks, 
Quagliariello (2006) finds that loan-loss provisions and bad debts increase in bad 
macroeconomic times. Pesola (2001) shows that the high level of both corporate and 
households’ indebtedness, along with shortfalls of GDP growth below forecast levels, 
contributed to the banking crises in the Nordic countries. Similar evidence is provided in 
cross-country comparisons by Bikker and Hu (2002), Laeven and Majnoni (2003) and 
Valckx (2003). Gambera (2000) and Meyer and Yeager (2001) document that a small 
number of macroeconomic variables are good predictors for non-performing loan ratio in the 
US. Similarly, Hoggarth et al. (2005) provide evidence of a clear link between the state of 
the UK business cycle and banks’ write-offs. 
While there is an extensive literature on the investment decisions of non-financial 
firms under macroeconomic instability (for a survey, see Carruth et al. (2000)), the role of 
uncertainty regarding future macroeconomic conditions has been largely neglected for banks 
instead. This is an important issue, since banks’ investments fuel those of the rest of the 
economy. To the best of my knowledge, there are only two recent papers that investigated 
this issue. 
Baum et al. (2005) use a portfolio model and a sample of US banks. Their results 
suggest that when macroeconomic uncertainty – proxied by the conditional variance of a 
relevant macroeconomic variable – increases, the cross-bank dispersion of the share of risky 
loans to total assets diminishes, as uncertainty hinders bank ability to foresee investment 
opportunities. In other words, they claim that higher uncertainty makes the signals on 
                                                            
2 For a survey, see Quagliariello (in press).  6  
expected returns noisier. Uncertainty would therefore push banks to rebalance the 
composition of their assets according to new (worse) signals provided by credit markets, 
adversely affecting the allocation of financial resources. This fosters herding behaviour and 
leads banks to behave more homogeneously than in quiet periods. This evidence is robust to 
the inclusion of several control variables and holds for total bank loans as well as for their 
main components. 
Adopting the same approach, Garcia and Calmes (2005) reach similar conclusions for 
the Canadian banking system. Their results, though based on univariate regression, confirm 
that there is a negative relationship between the proxy for macroeconomic uncertainty and 
the cross-bank variance of the loan-to-asset ratio. In other words, also Canadian 
intermediaries show herding behaviour when they deal with more pronounced aggregate 
uncertainty.  
3. Banks’ lending decisions under uncertainty: Baum, Caglayan and Ozkan’s model 
Adapting the framework for non-financial firms’ investment decisions developed by 
Beaudry et al. (2001), Baum et al. (2005) propose a model in order to describe how banks 
set the optimal composition of their portfolios.  
In their scheme, banks’ managers operate in a risky environment and, in each period, 
can invest deposits into two different assets: loans and bonds. The investment in bonds is 
assumed for simplicity free of default risk, but it bears market risk since the value of the 
securities may change as a result of varying market conditions. However, this risk is more 
predictable and, more importantly, it can be managed and hedged. The return of such an 
investment is the risk free rate (rf).  
On the other hand, loans to customers entail the exposure to two different sources of 
risk: market risk and default risk. The latter is the result of an idiosyncratic component – due 
to the probability that the specific customer will default in the future without repaying the 
debt – and systemic factors, correlated to the overall status of the economy. In fact, it is well 
documented that in bad macroeconomic times the riskiness of bank portfolios tends to 
increase.   7  
For bank i at time t, the investment in risky loans provides a stochastic return (ri) equal 
to the risk-free rate plus a risk premium(rpi), which is equal for all loans – assumed to be 
homogeneous – and does not depend on the riskiness of the single borrower
3: 
i f i rp r r + =        ( 1 )  
The risk premium has an expected value E(rpi)=ρ and a variance Var(rpi)=σ
2
ε.  
The return on loans can thus be expressed as 
i f i r r ε ρ + + =        (2) 
where εi is a random component distributed as N(0, σ
2
ε). Baum et al. also assume that 
each bank has a specific portfolio with different riskiness structure and, hence, the random 
components of return across different intermediaries are not correlated (E[εiεj]=0). 
Within this framework, banks’ managers deal with a portfolio optimization problem. 
They rebalance the composition of their assets in order to obtain the preferred combination 
of risk and expected return. According to their utility functions, they have to choose the 
shares αi and (1-αi) of their assets to invest respectively in loans and bonds. However, before 
taking the decision, banks observe neither the actual risk premium nor the random 
component εi, but only a noisy signal of them: 
ν ε + = i i S        (3)   
where ν  is a random variable independent of εi with a normal distribution N(0, σ
2
ν). 
By assumption, the noise component (ν) of the signal banks receive is identical for all of 
them, while the overall signals remain different across intermediaries because of εi. In fact, 
even though all banks are believed to have the ability to overcome asymmetric information 
problems, cross-sectional differences in their private information set remain. In principle, ν 
may be observed and uncertainty eliminated if all banks would share their private 
information. However, information sharing is unlikely to hold in the credit market.  
                                                            
3 The subscript t is omitted since the model describes a one-period problem.  8  
The noise ν can be interpreted as the degree of uncertainty on future macroeconomic 
conditions. Its impact on banks is homogeneous, regardless of managers’ ability to predict 
the random component of loan return εi. When macroeconomic uncertainty increases, the 
higher variance of ν makes the estimates of the true return of loans less precise. The 
assumption of independence between ν and εi is now clearer; indeed, it is plausible that the 
aggregate macroeconomic shock is not correlated with the idiosyncratic component of loan 
returns.  
In order to determine the expected return on loans (ri), bank managers have to predict 
the value of εi. Without observing the noisy signal, banks’ (unconditional) forecast on εi 
would be the mean of its distribution, i.e. zero. However, banks do observe the signal and 
can extract additional information from it. The expected value of the return from loans 
conditional upon Si, E[εi|Si], is assumed to be a constant proportion (λ) of the signal, where λ 
represents a linear regression coefficient of εi on Si: 












    
The conditional expected return of the i-th bank’s portfolio E[Ri|Si] is therefore given 
by the following expression: 
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and the conditional variance Var[Ri|Si] is: 
2 2 ] | [ ν λσ αi i i S R Var =        (6) 
Risk-averse banks are assumed to have the following utility function: 
] | [
2
] | [ ] | [ i i i i i i S R Var S R E S U E
ω
− =
     (7)    9  
which is increasing in expected return and decreasing in return volatility (and ω is the 
coefficient of risk aversion).  
Employing the portfolio’s mean/variance equations, it is straightforward to derive the 
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The variance of the cross-sectional distribution of the loan-to-asset ratio is negatively 
correlated to the level of macroeconomic uncertainty σ
2
ν. Indeed, taking the first derivative 
of the variance of αi with respect to σ
2














      (10) 
which provides a testable implication of the hypothesis that the cross-sectional 
variance of the loan-to-asset ratio narrows as macroeconomic uncertainty increases.  
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 Therefore, it is essential to control for this component when testing for the impact of 
macroeconomic uncertainty. The choice of a proper proxy for idiosyncratic risk may 
however represent a major problem. 
In sum, there are two hypotheses to be tested: 
Hypothesis 1): When macroeconomic uncertainty increases, banks tend to allocate 
assets in their portfolios more homogeneously (the variance of α across banks reduces);  10 
Hypothesis 2): When idiosyncratic uncertainty increases, banks tend to behave more 
heterogeneously (the variance of α across banks rises). 
4. Empirical evidence 
4.1 Data 
The impact of macroeconomic uncertainty on banks’ lending decisions modelled in the 
previous section can be empirically tested in the following way: 




, , ) ( ε ν σ σ ,     (a) 
where LTAi,t is the loan-to-asset ratio and Vart(LTAi,t) is its cross-sectional variance at 
time t; σ
2
ν represents macroeconomic uncertainty evaluated at time t; σ
2
ε is the idiosyncratic 
uncertainty and ut is the error term. 
The cross-bank variance of the LTA is built up using quarterly data (1990q1-2005q1) 
for a sample of more than 900 intermediaries, representing virtually the entire Italian 
banking system in each quarter. Before 1990 the Italian credit market was intensely 
regulated by public authorities for both monetary policy and supervisory purposes
4. The 
results of the analysis would be therefore not reliable. Furthermore, formal Chow tests reject 
at the 1 per cent level the null hypothesis of no structural break in 1990 and advice to split 
the sample. 
Overall, the dataset includes 58.146 bank/quarter observations. A summary of the 
characteristics of the sample is provided in table 1.  
                                                            
4 For example, as far as monetary policy is concerned, in 1986q1-1986q2 and 1987q4-1988q1 ceilings on 
the supply of credit that each bank may provide to the aggregate of its customers (so-called massimale sugli 
impieghi) were still in use. These constraints, intended for controlling liquidity and aggregate demand, limited 
banks’ ability to expand their shares in the loan market. As a result, even in the absence of specific obligations 
for banks to subscribe Treasury bonds, the banking system’s demand for bonds increased (see Cotula, 1989). 
Also supervisory rules were particularly strict. According to the banking law, intermediaries were classified as 
retail banks, providing only short-term credit, and medium and long-term credit institutions. Until 1990, when 
the Bank of Italy decided to liberalize banks’ branch networks, the opening of new branches was limited by the 
system of “branch plans”. These legal barriers between different categories of banks and the administrative 
constraints on the opening of branches were an obstacle to the enlargement of banks’ activity (see Ciocca, 
2004).  11 
Accounting ratios for the individual institutions are built up using the statistics that 
intermediaries are required to report to the Bank of Italy; the macroeconomic variables are 
drawn from the OECD main economic indicators (MEI) dataset.  
The evolution of the loan-to-asset ratio over time is drawn in figure 1. The ratio shows 
a clear ascending trend, witnessing the increasing liberalization of the Italian credit market 
and the competitive incentives to improve market positions that banks received during the 
‘90s. Also, the gradual reduction of interest rates made the subscription of securities, 
especially government bonds, less profitable for banks. 
Given the relevance of this trend, I prefer to estimate model (a) using the coefficient of 
variation rather than the variance of the LTA in order to have a unit-free measure of 
dispersion: 




, , ) ( ε ν σ σ      (b) 
Table 2 shows the main descriptive statistics for the loan-to-asset ratio (LTA), its 
variance (STDLTA) and coefficient of variation (CVLTA). Data refer to the whole banking 
system as well as to 5 dimensional breakdowns
5.  
Looking at the table, there is no evidence of a clear relationship between LTA 
dispersion and bank size during the fifteen years under observation. Fig. 2 provides a clearer 
picture of this relationship. 
Large banks are those that, in the period under examination, have the smaller cross-
sectional dispersion of the indicator. By contrast, small banks are those that behave more 
heterogeneously. However, in the last two years, major and large banks show the highest 
levels of the variation coefficients. This may indicate that recently large banks have adopted 
more diversified growth strategies. 
Certainly, the evolution of LTA is also affected by the consolidation process of the 
Italian banking system. Indeed, after M&As, the newly established banking groups tended to 
                                                            
5 According to the classifications provided by the Bank of Italy, banks are grouped into five categories 
depending on the size of their total assets: major banks (total assets greater than 45 billion euros), large (total 
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reorganize their portfolios and, in some cases, to allocate specific assets to specialized 
entities of the group. This is particularly evident for major banks in 1995 and 1998. 
4.2 Measuring macroeconomic uncertainty 
There are several ways to measure macroeconomic uncertainty. According to Driver et 
al. (2004) and Sepulveda-Umanzor (2004) two approaches dominate the empirical literature: 
the “survey-based approach” (or cross-section dispersion forecasts) and the “model-based 
approach” (or time-series conditional volatility).  
The first approach exploits the surveys on the expectations on relevant macroeconomic 
variables and obtains a measure of uncertainty as the intra-personal dispersion of the 
expectations. A main shortcoming of this methodology is that the intra-personal dispersion 
(i.e., the true uncertainty) is not observable and may only be approximated using the inter-
personal dispersion of the expectations (the disagreement across forecasters). This procedure 
is reliable only if the latter measure is a valid proxy for the former (Zarnowitz and Lambros, 
1987; Bomberger, 1996). In fact, it is possible that, even if each forecaster is extremely 
uncertain about future events, all of them submit similar estimates. Then, this measure would 
fail to capture the amount of existing uncertainty (Grier and Perry, 2000).  
The second metric is obtained employing the realised values of the macroeconomic 
variables in order to get statistical or econometric estimations of their variability. Even 
though many measures of uncertainty can be implemented from time-series (unconditional 
variance, one-step ahead forecast errors, etc.), the conditional heteroskedasticity estimated 
with G(ARCH) models is one of the most commonly used (Engle, 1982; Bollerslev, 1986). 
In the case of GARCH(1,1), the conditional variance of a variable (ht) can be estimated, 
along with its mean, using the following specification: 
t t t x y η β + =  
1
2
1 − − + + = t t t gh a c h η  
                                                                                                                                                                                   
assets between 20 and 45 billion euros), medium-sized (7-20), small (1-7), minor (total assets up to 1 billion 
euros).  13 
Provided that the coefficients on the ARCH and GARCH effects are statistically 
significant, the fitted values of ht can be employed as proxies for uncertainty. This approach 
has a potential drawback, indeed as highlighted by Sepulveda-Umanzor (2004): “rather than 
measuring uncertainty, the model-based approach really measures volatility. The former is a 
feature that forward-looking agents face when confronting any decision, the latter is a 
characteristic of the data once uncertainty has been solved”. A second problem is that the 
time-series used in the analyses do not necessarily exhibit (G)ARCH processes. 
Given the complexity of defining reliable proxies for uncertainty, ideally one would 
use both the approaches recalled above. However, due to lack of data on survey outputs, in 
this paper I use the latter and calculate the conditional heteroskedasticity of relevant 
macroeconomic variables as proxies for macroeconomic uncertainty
6. In spite of some of its 
shortcomings, this approach is widely used in the literature. As a robustness check, I also use 
the one-step ahead forecast error as an alternative metric. 
For this purpose, I use the OECD monthly series of the composite leading indicator, 
industrial production and consumer price index (CPI). The time span of the series is 
1975m1-2005m3. The composite leading indicator is an aggregate series that shows a 
leading relationship with the reference series for the business cycle in a given country; the 
indicator can therefore be used as an early signal of the main turning points of the aggregate 
economic activity. The industrial production index measures the increases and decreases in 
production output. Given the impact that fluctuations in the level of industrial activity have 
on the remainder of the economy, the variable is frequently used as a short-term indicator of 
the business cycle. The indicator is seasonally adjusted. 
As pointed out by Carruth et al. (2000), often the literature that uses conditional 
variance as a measure of uncertainty assumes, rather than testing, both the stationarity of the 
time-series and the presence of (G)ARCH effects. In what follows, the original monthly 
series are transformed in order to obtain the monthly percentage rates of change of industrial 
production (INDPRODC), CPI (INFL) and the leading indicator (LEADINDC). The 
transformation allows to work with stationary series (table 3) and consistently estimate their 
                                                            
6 For Italy, a quarterly survey on firms’ expectations regarding future inflation is available only since 
December 1999.  14 
conditional variance. For each variable, the specification of the auxiliary regression 
employed for the ADF tests has been selected via a general-to-simple-approach, as suggested 
by Enders (1995), starting with 6 lags, a trend and a constant.  
The results of the Lagrange Multiplier tests for null hypothesis of no ARCH effects 
suggest that both industrial production growth and CPI inflation exhibit significant 
conditional heteroskedasticity; for the series of the composite leading indicator, the test is 
not significant instead (table 4). Accordingly, I exclude the latter variable from the analysis 
and estimate the GARCH models only for the former two variables. 
Tables 5a and 5b provide the results of the unrestricted GARCH(1,1) models 
performed on industrial production growth (INDPRODC) and inflation (INFL). In the 
variance equation, the coefficients of the ARCH and GARCH effects are significant 
respectively at the 5 and 1 per cent levels for both the variables.  
The conditional variance (ht) derived from each GARCH model is finally averaged to 
quarterly frequency in order to obtain the measure of macroeconomic uncertainty 
(INDPRVA and INFLVA)
7.  
These variables enter in model (b) as generated regressors. They measure with noise 
the true, though unobservable, regressor (
2
ν σ ). The estimates for model (b) can therefore be 
biased and inconsistent if the ARCH-type model employed is misspecified. 
Therefore, I use the Lagrange Multiplier in order to test for neglected serial correlation 
of up to order 12 in the standardized squared residuals of the ARCH models. The LM tests 
cannot reject the null hypothesis of no additional ARCH effects at any conventional level. 
These results confirm that the specification is able to capture all the conditional 
heteroskedasticity present in industrial production and inflation series and corroborate the 
choice of the parsimonious GARCH (1,1). The correct specification of the generating 
regressions should ensure parameter consistency also in the derived model (Pagan and Ullah, 
1988).  
                                                            
7 Strictly speaking this measure is not the quarterly volatility, but the average of the monthly volatilities in a 
given quarter. As an alternative measure I also use the quarter-end conditional variance. Results are unchanged.  15 
Figures 3 and 4 plot the coefficient of variation of the loan-to-asset ratio and the 
measures of industrial production and inflation uncertainty respectively.  
In the aftermath of the EMS crisis in the first half of the ‘90s, the coefficient of 
variation of the LTA ratio reaches the lowest figure. In the same period, macroeconomic – 
especially inflation – uncertainty rises markedly. 
The dispersion of the LTA shows a significant increase during the second half of the 
decade, a period characterized by the vigorous process of consolidation, which encouraged 
banks to look for new markets and more profitable activities. This may help explain more 
heterogeneous behaviour across intermediaries. Both measures of economic uncertainty 
show a descending trend during the ‘90s; for inflation, this tendency is particularly 
noticeable at the end of those years. This is likely one of the benefits of the EMU 
convergence process.  
4.3 Econometric specification and results 
The final specification of model (b) is the following: 
t t t
t t t t i t
u SHAREC f INDPRODC e
INFL d STDNPL c h b a LTA CV
+ + +
+ + + + = +1 , ) (
   (c)   
where ht is the estimated conditional variance of either industrial production growth 
(INDPRVA) or inflation (INFLVA). According to hypothesis 1), the expected sign of the 
coefficient of this regressor is negative. Along with the proxy for macroeconomic 
uncertainty (ht), I also introduce some control variables.  
First, I employ the 1-quarter lead of the cross-sectional variance of the non-performing 
loan ratio (STDNPL). This indicator is a proxy for the idiosyncratic uncertainty. If at time t 
the idiosyncratic uncertainty (εi) increases allowing “good” banks to correctly predict the 
expected return/risk of different investments, in the following periods the riskiness of those 
banks should be significantly lower than that of poorly-informed intermediaries. Therefore, 
the variance of the non-performing loans ratio across intermediaries should widen. Of 
course, the NPL ratio is also affected by systemic factors; however, its cross-sectional 
dispersion may still provide some useful insight regarding hypothesis 2). The expected sign  16 
of this variable is positive. Since the variable may be endogenous, in the estimation it is 
instrumented with the lagged value of STDNPL. 
Second, I use the first moment of inflation (INFL) and industrial production growth 
(INDPRODC) in order to control for the overall macroeconomic conditions and to test the 
robustness of the results in the presence of the levels of the variables (Huizinga, 1993). 
Inflation is frequently found as an indicator of macroeconomic mismanagement; high 
inflation may therefore, per se, imply uncertainty on the future. A negative coefficient is 
therefore my a priori belief. By contrast, it is not immediately clear the impact of industrial 
production growth on the dependent variable. Indeed, it is difficult to say whether in good 
times banks tend to behave more or less homogeneously.   
Lastly, I introduce a variable (SHAREC) aiming at assessing the impact of the 
conditions on financial markets, since this is another factor that may influence banks’ 
decisions. This variable is the quarterly rate of change of the “all-shares” index calculated by 
the OECD from daily closing quotations.  
Tables 6, 7 and 8 summarize the variables used in the estimations, show the main 
descriptive statistics of the regressors and illustrate the pair-wise correlations between the 
variables. It is interesting to note that the correlations between the dispersion of the loan-to-
asset ratio – both in terms of variance and coefficient of variation – and uncertainty measures 
are negative and statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. 
Table 9 presents the instrumental-variable regression results. Newey-West standard 
errors are calculated assuming an autocorrelation up to the order 4. 
In both the specification, the proxies for macroeconomic uncertainty show the 
expected negative sign and are statistically significant, although their economic relevance is 
different. In particular, the magnitude of the coefficient on INFLVA (-1.23) suggests that 
this variable is an important determinant of LTA dispersion.  
Overall, this confirms that Italian banks behave more homogenously when the 
perspectives of the economy are unclear. This is consistent with the evidence regarding US 
and Canadian banks reported respectively by Baum et al. (2004) and Garcia and Calmes 
(2005) and with the results of Beaudry et al. (2001) for UK non-financial firms.  17 
However, it is worth pointing out that, with aggregate data, no inference can be drawn 
on the allocation of funds to particular loans and hence the credit risk of the loan book. In 
other words, the model implicitly assumes that bank’s loan portfolio is homogenous. These 
assumptions should be ideally tested providing results for several loan categories, along with 
the aggregate ones. Unfortunately, due to data limitations, this is not feasible at this stage.  
The proxy for idiosyncratic uncertainty is also statistically significant and takes on a 
positive sign. When the returns on specific investments are less easily predictable, better-
informed banks can exploit their competitive advantage and behave in a different way with 
respect to poorly-informed intermediaries. 
In sum, results confirm that systemic uncertainty, both on the real and the financial 
side of the economy, induces intermediaries to herding behaviour. In contrast, individual 
uncertainty leads banks to behave more heterogeneously when deciding the allocation of 
their assets.  
As far as the other control variables are concerned, industrial production growth is 
never significant. The inclusion of different variables aiming at controlling for the evolution 
of the business cycle, such as the leading indicator, demand and consumption growth or 
changes in the interest rates, does not change this evidence. This result indicates that the 
level of aggregate economic activity does not have any impact on the cross-sectional 
variability of the share that banks decide to invest in risky loans. However, the significance 
of the control variables must be interpreted with caution since the proxy for uncertainty is a 
generated regressor and the coefficient on it is significantly different from zero (Pagan, 
1984; Oxley and McAleer, 1993).  
The coefficient on inflation is not significant as well. The changes of the stock 
exchange index are slightly significant in the model with industrial production uncertainty. 
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4.4 Robustness checks 
4.4.1  Size breakdowns 
The dataset with banks’ size breakdowns is used for robustness checks. The model is 
therefore estimated using panel data techniques that exploit the cross-sectional dimension 
and allow obtaining more robust results
8. For the estimation, I can exploit 300 observations 
(60 quarters / 5 size breakdowns). The results of the random effect model are presented in 
table 10. 
They appear consistent with those obtained in the previous paragraph. Macroeconomic 
uncertainty has a significant negative impact on the cross-bank dispersion of the loan-to-
asset ratio, while the proxy for idiosyncratic uncertainty shows a positive sign. In these 
specifications, industrial production growth is significant, though at the 10 per cent level, 
and takes on a negative sign. According to this evidence, banks would take more uniform 
portfolio decisions during expansions. Inflation remains not significant, contrasting the idea 
that higher inflation levels are perceived as signals of economic turmoil. The Hausman tests 
for both the regressions imply that the random effects are appropriate for this sample.  
4.4.2 Uncertainty based on the one-step ahead forecast error 
In this paragraph, I use a different proxy for macroeconomic uncertainty in order to 
check whether my previous results are robust to different measures. The metric proposed 
here is based on the 1-step ahead forecast errors of the autoregressive models of industrial 
production growth and inflation. As suggested by Serven (1998), to ensure that the 
predictions use no more information than that available at the time they are formulated, they 
are computed from recursive estimation of the autoregressions. Therefore, for each variable, 
I estimate recursively the following auto-regressive model of order 2: 
t t t t y y y υ β β β + + + = − − 2 2 1 1 0  
                                                            
8 In principle, if a bank’s size is a proxy for the type of loans a bank grants, the evidence provided in this 
section might partly overcome the shortcomings related to loan heterogeneity mentioned above. Unfortunately, 
this is not necessarily the case, since Italian banks are not specialized according to their size.  19 
The initial length of the series is set at 50. Since the dataset contains 362 observations 
(quarters) and I introduce 2 lags, I estimate 310 (362-2-50) regressions, in order to compute 
the 1-step ahead forecast errors. Using the recursive parameter estimates, I finally obtain the 
alternative uncertainty measure as the quarterly mean absolute values of the monthly one-
step ahead forecast errors for industrial production and inflation (respectively INDPRODFE 
and INFLFE).  
Table 11 provides the results of the regression of LTA variation coefficient on 
INDPRODFE and INFLFE.   
The role of uncertainty is confirmed by this exercise. Both additional proxies for 
macroeconomic uncertainty are statistically significant and negative. In particular, inflation 
unpredictability seems to be the most relevant determinant of banks’ herding behaviours. 
Idiosyncratic uncertainty remains significantly positive. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper tries to disentangle which are the determinants of banks’ decisions 
regarding the allocation of their portfolios; in particular it aims at assessing whether 
macroeconomic uncertainty plays a role in this choice. Following the portfolio model 
proposed by Baum et al., I discuss how Italian banks choose between loans and risk-free 
assets when the uncertainty on macroeconomic conditions increases. With respect to 
previous work, which neglects the role of idiosyncratic factors, the impact of 
macroeconomic uncertainty is assessed, taking also into account bank-specific sources of 
uncertainty.  
The econometric results confirm that macroeconomic uncertainty does have a role in 
Italian banks’ investment decisions. In periods of increasing turmoil, banks receive noisier 
signals on the expected returns of loans and, therefore, tend to behave more homogeneously, 
as shown by the reduction of the cross-sectional dispersion of the loan-to-asset ratio. A 
plausible corollary is that the allocation of bank credit becomes less efficient. Idiosyncratic 
uncertainty is also relevant and its coefficient takes on a positive sign. When the returns on 
specific investments are less easily predictable, better-informed banks can exploit their 
competitive advantage and behave in a different way with respect to poorly-informed  20 
intermediaries. These results are generally confirmed when bank size breakdowns are 
employed in the estimation. Furthermore, they are robust to the inclusion of several control 
variables and the use of different measures of macroeconomic uncertainty. 
Macroeconomic uncertainty is therefore an important determinant of banks’ lending 
decisions and a cause of potential disturbances in financial resource allocation. Since bank 
loans are a relevant source of financing for the non-financial sector, central banks and 
supervisory authorities should monitor the degree of uncertainty on the evolution of the main 
economic aggregates in order to strengthen macroeconomic and financial stability.   21 




no. banks per quarter 
(average)
no. obs
FULL SAMPLE 953 58146
MAJOR BANKS 14 870
LARGE BANKS 16 972
MEDIUM BANKS 36 2203
SMALL BANKS 143 8740
MINOR BANKS 744 45361
TIME-SPAN
THE SAMPLES: SUMMARY
1st quarter 1990 - 1st quarter 2005
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Table 2
Variable N. obs Mean STD Min Max
LTA 61 44.81 6.68 36.23 58.10
STDLTA 61 15.81 3.91 10.51 21.52
C V L T A 6 10 . 3 50 . 0 40 . 2 70 . 4 0
LTA 61 44.16 4.33 32.95 51.58
STDLTA 61 13.12 8.56 4.00 28.47
C V L T A 6 10 . 2 90 . 1 80 . 0 90 . 6 2
LTA 61 46.57 3.27 39.38 53.89
STDLTA 61 14.39 6.98 4.67 28.26
C V L T A 6 10 . 3 10 . 1 40 . 1 00 . 6 3
LTA 61 50.00 7.27 37.79 62.92
STDLTA 61 16.53 4.18 7.56 22.01
C V L T A 6 10 . 3 30 . 0 60 . 1 70 . 4 5
LTA 61 48.28 7.82 36.87 62.90
STDLTA 61 19.00 5.13 10.55 24.43
CVLTA 61 0.39 0.07 0.26 0.51
LTA 61 43.86 6.51 35.86 57.34
STDLTA 61 14.85 3.62 10.33 20.68








Notes: LTA is the average of the loan-to-asset ratio; STDLTA is the cross-sectional variance
of the loan-to-asset-ratio; CVLTA is the cross-sectional coefficient of variation of the loan-to-
asset-ratio.
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Table 3
Variable Z(t) statistics
1% critical value 5% critical value 10% critical value
INDPRODC (2) -6.512*** -3.452 -2.876 -2.57
INFL (3) -4.532*** -3.986 -3.426 -3.13
LEADINDC (4) -5.657*** -2.58 -1.95 -1.62
ADF TESTS FOR UNIT ROOTS (1)
Interpolated Dickey-Fuller
*, **, *** significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level respectively.
Notes: (1) Augmented Dickey Fuller test for unit root. Selection of the auxiliary regression via general-to-simple
procedure. (2) 5 lags and drift included in the regression. (3) 5 lags, trend and drift included in the regression. 







Chi-squared df Chi-squared df
INDPRODC 14.206*** 1 24.606*** 4
INFL 3.833** 1 52.922*** 4
LEADINDC 0.005 1 6.928 4
LM TEST FOR ARCH EFFECTS (1)
ARCH(1) ARCH(4)
*, **, *** significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level respectively.
Notes: (1) Lagrange Multiplier test for ARCH effects. 4 lags included in the auxiliary autoregression.
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Table 5a
Coefficient Semi-robust SE Sign. lev.
Mean equation
INDPRODC (LAG1) -0.2152 0.0602 ***
CONSTANT 0.0793 0.0639
Variance equation
ARCH(1) 0.0462 0.0187 **





LM ARCH 1-12  F(12,332)=  0.37746
-630,765
 ESTIMATION OF MACROECONOMIC UNCERTAINTY
GARCH (1,1) FOR INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION GROWTH
361
Chi2(1)=12.78
*, **, *** significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level respectively.
Notes: Lagrange Multiplier test for ARCH effects is reported.
 
Table 5b
Coefficient Semi-robust SE Sign. lev.
Mean equation
INFL (LAG1) 0.2901 0.0561 ***
INFL (LAG2) 0.0858 0.0576
INFL (LAG3) 0.2054 0.0563 ***
INFL (LAG4) 0.1478 0.0549 ***
INFL (LAG5) 0.0218 0.0522
INFL (LAG6) 0.1103 0.0570 *
CONSTANT 0.0429 0.0170 **
Variance equation
ARCH(1) 0.1156 0.5584 **





LM ARCH 1-12  F(12,322)=   1.4037
-29.64749
 ESTIMATION OF MACROECONOMIC UNCERTAINTY
GARCH (1,1) FOR CPI INFLATION
356
Chi2(6)=323.34
*, **, *** significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level respectively.
Notes: Lagrange Multiplier test for ARCH effects is reported.   25 
Table 6
Name Description Source
LTA Loan-to-asset ratio (%) BoI Sup.statistics
STDLTA Cross-sectional STD of LTA (%) BoI Sup.statistics
CVLTA Coefficient of variation of LTA (STDLTA/MLTA) BoI Sup.statistics
STDNPL Cross-sectional STD of non-performing loan ratio (%) BoI Sup.statistics
INDPRODC Industrial production change (%) OECD
INFL CPI inflation (%) OECD
SHAREC Share price change (%) OECD
INDPRVA Conditional variance of INDPRODC OECD





Variable N. obs Mean STD Min Max
S T D N P L 6 19 . 2 40 . 9 37 . 6 0 1 1 . 2 6
INDPRODC 61 0.04 0.53 -1.18 1.19
INFL 61 0.28 0.16 0.03 0.69
SHAREC 61 0.60 3.80 -8.15 11.67
I N D P R V A 6 10 . 8 60 . 3 70 . 4 12 . 2 2





LTA STDLTA CVLTA STDNPL INDPRVA INFLVA
LTA 1.000
STDLTA 0.948 1.000
CVLTA 0.696 0.888 1.000
STDNPL 0.150 0.398 0.700 1.000
INDPRVA -0.620 -0.676 -0.637 -0.415 1.000
INFLVA -0.777 -0.728 -0.526 -0.208 0.757 1.000
Coefficients in bold are significant at the 5 per cent level.
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS 26 
Explanatory 
variables
Coeffic. N-W SE Sign. lev. Coeffic. N-W SE Sign. lev.
intercept 0.1028 0.1099 0.0868 0.0953
INDPRVA -0.0395 0.0187 ** - -
INFLVA - - -1.2254 0.4394 ***
LEAD(STDNPL) 0.0311 0.0101 *** 0.0334 0.0090 ***
INFL -0.0230 0.0312 -0.0264 0.0323
INDPRODC -0.0132 0.0085 -0.0126 0.0083





INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE REGRESSION OF CV(LTA)







*, **, *** significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level respectively. The estimated regressions are:
CV(LTA)=intercept+b1INDPRVA+b2LEAD(STDNPL)+b3INFL+b4INDPRODC+b5SHAREC+u
CV(LTA)=intercept+b1INFLVA+b2LEAD(STDNPL)+b3INFL+b4INDPRODC+b5SHAREC+u
Notes: Newey-West robust standard errors are reported; the errors are assumed to be heteroskedastic and autocorrelated
up to 4 lags. LEAD(STDNPL) instrumented with LAG(STDNPL).  
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Explanatory 
variables
Coeffic. SE Sign. lev. Coeffic. SE Sign. lev.
intercept 0.3180 0.0272 *** 0.3473 0.0267 ***
INDPRVA -0.1080 0.0180 *** - -
INFLVA - - -3.6291 0.4449 ***
LEAD(STDNPL) 0.0150 0.0016 *** 0.0148 0.0015 ***
INFL -0.0377 0.0418 -0.0566 0.0357
INDPRODC -0.0194 0.0092 * -0.0167 0.0088 *







INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE PANEL REGRESSION OF CV(LTA)(1)









*, **, *** significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level respectively. The estimated regressions are: 
CV(LTA)=intercept+b1INDPRVA+b2LEAD(STDNPL)+b3INFL+b4INDPRODC+b5SHAREC+a+u
CV(LTA)=intercept+b1INFLVA+b2LEAD(STDNPL)+b3INFL+b4INDPRODC+b5SHAREC+a+u
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Explanatory 
variables
Coeffic. N-W SE Sign. lev. Coeffic. N-W SE Sign. lev.
intercept 0.0805 0.1039 0.2309 0.0606 ***
INDPRODFE -0.0187 0.0106 * - -
INFLFE - - -0.2577 0.0544 ***
LEAD(STDNPL) 0.0329 0.0098 *** 0.0218 0.0053 ***
INFL -0.0752 0.0410 * -0.1154 0.0235 ***
INDPRODC -0.0173 0.0056 -0.0070 0.0075
SHAREC -0.0012 0.0008 -0.0018 0.0006 ***
Nr. Obs.







IV REG. OF CV(LTA) WITH DIFFERENT PROXIES FOR UNCERTAINTY
Uncertainty on industrial 
production
*, **, *** significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level respectively. The estimated regressions are: 
CV(LTA)=intercept+b1INDPRODFE+b2LEAD(STDNPL)+b3INFL+b4INDPRODC+b5SHAREC+u
CV(LTA)=intercept+b1INFLFE+b2LEAD(STDNPL)+b3INFL+b4INDPRODC+b5SHAREC+u
Notes: Newey-West robust standard errors are reported; the errors are assumed to be heteroskedastic and autocorrelated
up to 4 lags.   LEAD(STDNPL) instrumented with LAG(STDNPL).














Fig. 2 CROSS-SECTIONAL DISPERSION OF LTA: SIZE BREAKDOWN 
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